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ABSTRACT 
This study is intended to analyse the current levels of financial depth and financial access in 
Indonesia and to analyse the factors affecting them. The analysis method used was a combina-
tion of descriptive quantitative, benchmarking, and literature reviews.  
The conclusion is that the financial depth in Indonesia has not shown a satisfactory level 
since it was the lowest, or the second lowest ranked country among the sampled countries. 
Meanwhile, the financial access in Indonesia is relatively better than its financial depth, espe-
cially for financial markets, in which Indonesia ranks in the lower average group. From 
literature reviews, it can be inferred that the main factor driving the poor financial depth in 
Indonesia is non-competitiveness of the institutions; whereas the driving force of poor financial 
access in Indonesia are geographical constraints, poverty, a high income gap, and a less than 
effective national financial development policy. 
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INTRODUCTION  
1. Background 
The financial sector serves as one of the 
‘backbone sectors’ in the economy because of its 
vital role in supporting economic activities. The 
financial sector (both formal and informal) 
serves as the ‘vein’ of an economy, which func-
tions to flow and circulate all the nutrients and 
necessary substances to the various economic 
sectors, which in normal times make an econ-
omy keep growing. Therefore, the financial 
sector’s development can be perceived as a stra-
tegic element in the national development policy 
framework. With the financial sector’s develop-
ment, it is hoped that the functions of the finan-
cial intermediaries (by means of the financial 
institutions and financial market) are able to 
develop optimally. 
The argument above is supported by Levine 
(2005) who concluded that financial intermedi-
aries were important for economic growth. The 
reverse causality economic growth is important 
to financial intermediaries does happen as well, 
yet the second causality is not a stimulus for the 
first causality. Moreover, Levine (2005) added 
that a theoretically and empirically well-
developed financial system diminished the con-
straints facing companies in acquiring external 
financing. It describes how financial develop-
ment works in a way to influence economic 
growth.  
How successful financial development is in a 
country can be measured with specific indicators 
reflecting the most important characteristics of 
its financial development i.e. financial depth (fi-
nancial size) and financial access (financial 
inclusion). The financial depth is important 
because of its effect on fiscal policy. A country 
with a high level of financial depth can imple-
ment a broader ‘expansionary fiscal policy’ and 
a bigger debt accumulation during downturns. 
Therefore, developed countries which generally 
have high levels of financial depth are better 
positioned to provide a counter cyclical fiscal 
stimulus during a crisis compared with the 
emerging countries which commonly have a low 
level of financial depth (Caballero and Krishna-
murthy, 2004).  
Financial access becomes an important issue 
because of its contribution to income inequality 
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reduction and increased economic growth (see 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2007; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). Income ine-
quality reduction is especially beneficial to the 
poor and other disadvantaged groups since it can 
create new and broader opportunities for them to 
invest in education. With greater financial 
access, they can finance their investment in edu-
cation to pursue more promising growth oppor-
tunities.  
Indonesia, like other developing countries, 
has a great deal of interest in its domestic finan-
cial development. In order to set realistic finan-
cial development goals and the strategies to 
achieve the set targets, it is essential that the cur-
rent level of financial development in Indonesia 
and the factors behind it are analysed and com-
prehended.  
In that regard, researchers and policymakers 
have lacked the focused, deep but also compre-
hensive literature covering these issues thus far. 
Several international institutions’ studies have 
indeed elaborated on financial development 
issues, yet the studies so far have only covered 
the developing countries. The other concern is 
that those studies do not show benchmarking 
results which may help inform the Indonesian 
government of where they are, and what is still 
required to achieve a sustainable national eco-
nomic development agenda. Such conditions 
may lead to biasedly formulated policy recom-
mendations for the Indonesian government, 
either for domestic policy actions or those 
related with international economic cooperation, 
which may create unsustainable national eco-
nomic development.  
With relevance to the background described 
above, this study is intended to reach two objec-
tives. The first objective is to analyse the current 
level of financial depth and the financial access 
in Indonesia in comparison with other relevant 
countries or country groups; and the second one 
is to analyse the factors affecting the current 
level of financial depth and financial access in 
Indonesia. As the research’s limitation, this 
study will not cover recommended solutions for 
the financial depth and financial access problems 
in Indonesia, and thus will leave these to further 
research. It is hoped that the picture of Indone-
sia’s financial depth and financial access result-
ing from this study can contribute to such further 
research.  
2. Data and Methodology  
The data employed in the study were sourced 
from a unique World Bank dataset, namely the 
Global Financial Development Database 
(GFDD).  
There are two financial system characteris-
tics measured in this study. The first characteris-
tic is the financial depth (financial size), defined 
as a measure describing how big the financial 
sector of a particular country is, if compared 
relative to its economic size (World Bank, 
2014). Meanwhile, the second one is the finan-
cial access (financial inclusion), defined as a 
measure reflecting the extent to which the public 
can have access to financial services (Čihák, et 
al., 2012).  
This study used several indicators to measure 
the financial depth and the financial access from 
either the financial institutions’ or the financial 
markets’ perspectives. These adopted indicators 
refer to a 4 x 2 Matrix, a Framework for Finan-
cial System Benchmarking which was developed 
by Čihák, et al. (2012). Other than those indica-
tors, one other indicator was added to the finan-
cial depth which covers both the financial insti-
tutions and the financial market. The latter 
indicator named private financing - was simply 
the combined private credit from the financial 
institutions, the domestic stock capitalization 
and the private debt securities from the financial 
markets. A brief but more detailed explanation is 
shown in Table 1.  
The obtained value of the indicators for 
Indonesia was subsequently benchmarked with 
that of the selected sample countries and relevant 
country groups. The selected sample countries 
comprised of the ASEAN main member coun-
tries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philip-
pines, Vietnam, Cambodia); the main emerging 
countries in the BRICS block (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa); the main ASEAN+6 
member countries (China, South Korea, Japan, 
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Australia, India); some big democratic countries 
which are also the main promoters of financial 
services liberalization and the world’s financial 
centers (the USA, the United Kingdom, and 
Germany). By taking the country samples above, 
several other countries which serve as Asian fi-
nancial centers (China/Shanghai, Japan/Tokyo, 
and Singapore) are definitely covered.  
Outside of the 18 sample countries, the aver-
age indicator values of relevant country groups 
were also incorporated into the analysis in order 
to provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
benchmarking. Those country groups were 1) 
Lower Middle Income Countries (LMCs), 2) 
Developing East Asia Pacific Countries (Dev. 
EAPs), and 3) the World.  
The calculation which was used in the analy-
sis section II.1 (Financial Depth Private 
Financing from All Financial Sectors) is as 
below.  
cpf INA . (1+g INA)
n
 = cpf COC . (1+g COC)
n 
 (1) 
the following decimal logarithm characteristic is 
used 
log ( a. b 
n
 ) = log a + n . log b  (2) 
where        
cpf INA  = current private financing of 
Indonesia (2011)  
cpf COC  =  current private financing of 
Indonesia’s competing country 
(2011)  
g INA  =  the growth rate of Indonesia’s pri-
vate financing 
g COC  =  the growth rate of private financ-
ing in Indonesia’s competing 
country 
n  = number of years for Indonesia to 
begin overtaking the target value 
of a competing country 
In the last part of the analysis section, some 
analysis work was prepared based on literature 
reviews to investigate the factors behind the cur-
rent financial depth and financial access condi-
tions in Indonesia.  
Table 1. Indicators and Source of Data 
Nr. Characteristics and Indicators  Source of Data 
1. Financial Depth/Size  Global Financial Development Data-
base (GFDD) – World Bank (2013)  a. Financial Institutions  
  i) Private Credit (banking and capital market)  
 (% GDP) 
  
b. 
ii) Assets of financial institutions (% GDP) 
Private financing (banking, non-banking financing, 
capital market, bond market, in % GDP) 
 c. Financial market  
i) Domestic stock capitalization and private debt 
securities (% GDP) 
ii) Stock trading value (% GDP) 
 
2. Financial Access  
 
Global Financial Development 
Database (GFDD) – World Bank (2013) 
 
 
 
 a. Financial Institutions  
  i) Bank branches per 100,000 people  
  ii) ATMs per 100,000 people  
  iii) Percentage of people with a formal account  
 b.  Financial Market  
  i) Percentage of market capitalization outside of top 10 
largest companies  
  ii) Percentage of value traded outside of top 10 traded 
companies. 
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RESULT AND ANALYSIS  
As described earlier in the data and method-
ology section (Table 1), the financial sector 
development indicators analysed in this research 
covered indicators for the financial institutions 
and the financial markets respectively, and pri-
vate financing indicators of the financial depth 
which covered both the financial institutions and 
the financial markets.  
1. Financial Depth  
Based on literature reviews, the financial 
depth level is positively linked to economic 
growth (Čihák, et al., 2012). In this relationship, 
the main indicator used to measure the financial 
depth of the financial institutions in a particular 
country was private credit. Čihák, et al. (2012) 
concluded that the higher the ratio of private 
credit to GDP a particular country has, the 
higher the financial depth of the financial insti-
tutions in that country will be. The banking sec-
tor is the financial institution which has gener-
ally dominated the channeling of private credit. 
Three proxies of financial depth were 
employed in Čihák, et al. (2012) and King and 
Levine (1993), and all those proxies reflected 
private credit: (1) current liabilities to GDP ratio; 
(2) domestic commercial bank credit to total 
domestic credit (commercial bank + central 
bank) ratio; (3) gross private claim to GDP ratio. 
As mentioned earlier, this study analysed the 
financial depth characteristics based on various 
indicators. From four selected indicators, the 
first two ratios (private credit to GDP and assets 
of financial institutions to GDP) were chosen for 
the financial institutions; while the other two 
(domestic stock capitalization and private debt 
securities to GDP ratio; and stock trading value 
to GDP) were selected for the financial markets. 
There is one more indicator for financial debt 
which measures financing for the private sector 
both from financial institutions and the financial 
markets, which is private financing to GDP ratio. 
The higher the ratios, the deeper or the larger a 
particular country’s financial sector is which 
shows a positive signal. 
1.1. Financial Institutions  
There are two main indicators of financial 
depth for the financial institutions; those are 1) 
private credit to GDP; and 2) assets of financial 
institutions to GDP. 
 Developed countries i.e. the United King-
dom, the United States, and Japan have been 
dominating the list of the top three countries 
having very high private credit to GDP ratios 
(Figure 1). Their ratios are within 175% to 200% 
of their respective GDP, six times deeper than 
Indonesia and the LMCs. Although these coun-
tries suffered from an economic crisis during 
2008 and 2009, it did not change their positions 
in the top three. 
Emerging countries such as South Africa, 
China, Singapore, and developing countries such 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
Figure 1. Private Credit (banking and capital market) to GDP. 
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as Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam have high 
private credit to GDP ratios, within the range of 
100% - 150% of their GDP. Indonesia still lags 
behind and ranks the second lowest after Cam-
bodia. Indonesia’s position is below the world 
average and the Low Middle Income Coun-
tries/LMCs average.  
Another important ratio for financial depth is 
the assets of financial institutions to GDP 
(Figure 2). The United States and Japan rank as 
the top two and have been showing their very 
large capacities, in comparison with other coun-
tries, to accumulate financial institution assets in 
the world, ten times deeper than the LMCs aver-
age.  
Consistently, Singapore, as the financial hub 
in Southeast Asia has the highest ratio, outrank-
ing Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and even 
outperforming the ASEAN+6 partner countries 
like Australia, South Korea, China, and India. 
Indonesia cannot compete with the main 
ASEAN countries or the ASEAN+6 partner 
countries. 
 Indonesia is no better than the average of 
the developing East Asia Pacific countries (Dev. 
EAPs), the world, or the LMCs. Indonesia is still 
below Vietnam, and only superior to Cambodia, 
which ranks as the lowest among the bench-
marked countries. The low deposit to GDP ratio 
is the rationale for this fact. Along with Cambo-
dia, Indonesia (32% of GDP) has recorded a 
very low deposit to GDP ratio (Figure 3). 
Despite having a better credit to deposit ratio 
than the other five benchmarked countries, this 
fact does not help much (Figure 4).  
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013 
 
Figure 2. Financial Institutions Assets to GDP  
 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 3. Deposit to GDP (% GDP) 
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The higher credit to deposit ratio in Indone-
sia (82%) may indicate that Indonesian financial 
institutions experience a tighter liquidity1 they 
face more fierce competition to acquire funding 
in comparison with other countries. This is in 
contrast to other facts. Amidst the cries for 
funding from the Indonesian domestic banks, 
there are a number of extremely rich Indonesian 
people who have deposits overseas, mainly in 
neighboring Singapore. It is believed that there 
is more than Rp 1,600 trillion of their money 
which is deposited in Singapore for various rea-
sons.2 Such beliefs confirm why Indonesia has 
recorded a very low deposit to GDP ratio.  
1.2. Financial Market 
The main financial depth indicators for the 
financial markets are domestic stock capitaliza-
tion and private debt securities to GDP ratio, and 
the stock trading value to GDP ratio. The 
essence of the financial market’s ratios is similar 
to the ratios of financial institutions; the higher 
the ratios, the deeper or the larger the financial 
market that a particular country has. Thus, in 
general the higher ratio is, the better it is. 
With reference to Figure 5, there is an 
emerging country one from the BRICS block, 
South Africa (251%) which has demonstrated a 
tremendous increase in the value of its domestic 
stock capitalization and private debt securities to 
GDP ratio since 2002. South Africa is currently 
in the top position, even above the United States 
with its state-of-the-art Wall Street, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan.  
Such a very deep financial market, as in 
South Africa, is not something which is com-
monly found in a developing country, and it may 
indicate an economic bubble is happening there. 
Forbes (2014) claimed that it is due in a large 
part to South Africa’s emerging markets’ bond 
                                                          
1
Standard Chartered. (2014) 
2
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/08/13/08750396
5/Buka-Cabang-di-Singapura-Mandiri-Incar-Rp-1600-T 
and 
http://finance.detik.com/read/2013/11/27/140923/2425
135/4/pemerintah-kesulitan-tarik-dana-orang-kaya-ri-rp-
1600-triliun-di-singapura. Downloaded on December 10, 
2013.  
bubble that has boosted foreign demand for the 
country’s bonds. South Africa also has a total of 
US$ 60.6 billion or 43% of its total debt de-
nominated in foreign currencies, and therefore it 
incurs a foreign currency risk. Malaysia may 
well be a similar story to South Africa.  
The current figures for South Africa’s and 
Malaysia’s external debt are 40% of GDP and 
68% of GDP respectively (2013), much higher 
than five years ago (30% GDP and 46% of GDP 
respectively); compared with Indonesia’s ratio 
which has been preserved at the secure and sta-
ble level of 30% of GDP (2013) and 31% of 
GDP in 2008. However, Indonesia (at 46%) still 
cannot compete, and remains in the lowest posi-
tion. The good news is that Indonesia still goes 
far beyond the LMCs. 
The other main indicator is stock traded 
value to GDP ratio (Figure 6), where the US 
shows its superiority over South Korea and the 
UK. Singapore has, as expected, outranked the 
other ASEAN members and is slightly above 
China. The benchmarking placed Indonesia 
(16%) in the bottom-but-one position, above 
Vietnam. However, Indonesia is still far better 
than the world average and the LMCs average. 
1.3.  Private Financing from All Financial 
Sectors  
Financing for the private sector to activate 
the economy does not solely depend on loans 
from banks, but can also be provided by other 
financial institutions, such as credit companies, 
leasing and financing companies, and factoring 
companies. Aside from those non-banking 
institutions, the private sector can also rely on 
the financial markets, like equities and bonds. 
Developed countries with high incomes can 
expect to accumulate huge amounts of funds for 
their financial sectors to stimulate their econo-
mies, while developing countries are not that 
fortunate. Measuring the total funds accumulated 
for the private sector can reflect more com-
pletely the financial depth a country has.  
The result of benchmarking private financing 
from all the other financial sectors has demon-
strated that (aside from investment) Indonesia 
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has a weak capability to accumulate financing 
for its private sector (Figure 7). Indonesia cannot 
exceed Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, or 
Thailand. Indonesia, unsurprisingly, outranks the 
Least Developed Countries/LDCs in ASEAN 
like Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar but 
not Vietnam (108% GDP). Indonesia still lags 
behind the ASEAN+6 partner countries, the 
BRICS countries group, and mostly behind the 
developed countries which have renowned fi-
nancial centers such as the US, the UK, and 
Germany; yet Indonesia (at 75% GDP) still 
manages to go beyond the LMCs. 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 4. Credit to Deposit 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 5. Domestic stock capitalization and private debt securities to GDP 
 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 6. Traded stock value to GDP  
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Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 7. Private Financing (Banking, Non-Banking, Capital Market, and Bond Market) to GDP 
 
However, Indonesia has the potential to 
increase its private financing sources because, as 
a number of analysts say, the number of people 
who are classed as belonging to the middle class 
keeps increasing, some 8 to 9 million people will 
enter the middle class each year up to either 
2020 or 2030, and this confers a great demo-
graphic advantage on Indonesia. 3    
In the context of this demographic advantage 
until 2030, this situation raises a question on 
how long it will take Indonesia to catch up to, 
and overtake, other benchmarked countries 
while benefiting from this advantage. In making 
a comparison, I selected comparable countries 
such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. 
The next countries would be Singapore, as the 
financial hub in South East Asia, then India and 
China. 
With reference to Table 2 and taking the 
trend of the increasing numbers of the middle 
class into consideration, we can assume a 
constant growth percentage for all the private 
financing sources. By using the projection 
approach and a logarithm computation charac-
teristic, we can find out that Indonesia may have 
a total value of private financing which will go 
beyond the Philippines in 14 years (i.e. in 2025), 
Singapore in 23 years (i.e. in 2034; assuming 
Singapore’s private financing growth rate is 
zero), Malaysia in 27 years (i.e. in 2038), China 
in 42 years (i.e. in 2053), and Thailand in 48 
years (i.e. in 2059). Based on the bigger initial 
amounts and the higher growth rate of private 
                                                          
3
 See Boston Consulting Group (2013), Reuters (2012), and 
World Bank (2009)  
financing that India had in 2011, by using a 
future projection it is impossible for Indonesia to 
catch up with India in the future. Thus, it is only 
the Philippines’ private financing that Indonesia 
can overtake before its demographic bonus ends 
in 2030.  
2. Financial Access  
Five indicators were adopted to undertake 
the benchmarking analysis on financial access, 
three indicators for the financial institutions 
(bank branches per 100,000 people; ATMs per 
100,000 people; and the percentage of people 
with a formal account) and two indicators for the 
financial market (percentage of market capitali-
zation outside of the top 10 largest companies; 
and percentage of the value traded outside of the 
top 10 traded companies). 
2.1. Financial Institutions  
The financial access was measured here by 
adopting indicators related to branches, ATMs, 
and formal accounts. Branches and ATMs ease 
financial access for depositors. Formal accounts 
owned by depositors also facilitate them to 
benefit from financial services provided by the 
financial institutions, not just the basic ones such 
as savings, withdrawals, transfers and 
borrowing. All in all, the higher these three 
indicators are, the more the public can access 
various kinds of financial services provided by 
the financial institutions. 
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 The existence of a large number of branches 
in either the developed countries (the United 
States, Japan, and Australia) or developing coun-
tries (Brazil and Russia) demonstrates that a 
direct interaction with their bank is something 
that is necessary for a bank’s customers. Despite 
this fact, Indonesia has only a relatively small 
number of bank branches (see Figure 8), yet it is 
placed higher than the Philippines, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam. 
Nowadays financial services are closely 
related with state-of-the-art facilities, one of 
which is the Automated Teller Machine (ATM). 
These ATMs’ functions are vital to the public in 
their efforts to have quick access to financial 
services. Unfortunately, as shown in Figure 9, 
Indonesia has a very limited number of ATMs 
compared with its population size; almost 
similar to the Philippines, which is another 
archipelagic country like Indonesia. India and 
Cambodia have slightly less ATMs’ per head of 
population than Indonesia. Indonesia is exactly 
the same as the LMCs’ average and slightly 
below the Dev. EAPs’ one, but nonetheless still 
far behind the world average. Indonesia cannot 
compete with the other main ASEAN countries 
(except Cambodia). Similarly this condition is 
also true in terms of the comparison of Indonesia 
with other benchmarked countries.  
Developed countries such as the US and 
Australia still rely heavily on ATMs, despite the 
existence of the currently fast-growing e-
banking technology. Nonetheless, it is South 
Korea, an Asian emerging country which 
provides the greatest financial access through 
ATMs. 
Financial access also means financial 
inclusion, a renowned issue much raised by 
multilateral development banks such as the 
World Bank and international forums such as the 
G20. One widely used measure for financial 
inclusion is the percentage of people with a 
formal (bank) account (Figure 10). 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 8. Bank branches per 100,000 people 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 9. ATMs per 100,000 people  
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Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 10. Percentage of people with formal account  
 
The benchmarking analysis places Indonesia 
(at 20%) as the second lowest, far better than 
Cambodia, which ranked the lowest among all 
the benchmark countries. Indonesia was far 
behind the other main ASEAN countries except 
the Philippines. India was the only ASEAN+6 
partner country having a similar value to 
Indonesia’s. Singapore, as expected, ranked the 
best among the ASEAN countries, placing the 
financial hub equal to the other developed coun-
tries such as Australia, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom. In comparison with the country group 
average, Indonesia was almost similar to the 
LMCs, but still significantly below the average 
of the Dev. EAPs and the world. 
2.2. Financial Market  
As explained earlier, two indicators were 
selected to assess financial access to the 
financial markets. The first was the percentage 
of the markets’ capitalization outside of the top 
10 largest companies, and the second was the 
percentage of the value traded outside of the top 
10 traded companies. These indicators indicate 
how well distributed the opportunities for all 
companies are - no matter the size of the public 
company to have financial access to the financial 
markets. The higher the indicator value, the 
more well distributed the financial access is; not 
only for the largest public companies, but also 
for smaller public companies. 
For the first indicator as shown in Figure 11, 
the benchmark result shows the country having 
the least opportunities for small public 
companies is Russia (38%), and it is followed by 
another BRICS country, Brazil. The value for 
Russia means that only 38% of the capital in 
Russian financial markets can benefit the smaller 
companies outside of Russia’s ten largest 
companies. In other words, 62% of the available 
capital in the Russian financial market is 
distributed to Russia’s ten largest companies. 
 
 
 Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 11.  Percent of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies 
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The good thing is that Indonesia (56%) is in 
the middle range, together with Australia. Indo-
nesia is slightly better than Russia, Brazil, Thai-
land, and Germany (55%). Indonesia is also 
better than the world average (47%), and not 
significantly different from the average of the 
LMCs (55%) and Dev. EAPs (59%). Only in 
ASEAN and the ASEAN+6 groups, does Indo-
nesia still lag behind. The relatively high figure 
for Indonesia shows that its middle class is 
growing and they can grab the financing oppor-
tunities which are available from the capital 
market to expand their small and medium sized 
companies.  
Singapore (74%) is in the top range, together 
with China and South Africa, outperforming 
developed countries on the list such as Japan, the 
UK, and the USA, and the ASEAN+6 partner 
countries as well. 
The benchmark result for the second indica-
tor, as shown in Figure 12, shows a relatively 
similar result. Russia is placed in the lowest 
rank, while China and South Africa are in the 
highest rank. Singapore - claimed to be the re-
gion’s financial hub–is still the best in Southeast 
Asia and it exceeds the US. South Korea and 
India also perform better than the US.  
Indonesia (56%) shares a similar indicator 
value together with the Philippines and the aver-
age LMCs. Indonesia performs better than two 
of the BRICS countries: Russia and Brazil, a 
developed country (Germany), and also the 
world average. In comparison with other 
ASEAN countries and the ASEAN+6 countries, 
Indonesia can still not yet compete with them. 
From the last two indicators of financial 
access to the financial markets, China and 
Singapore have persistently shown themselves to 
be the best at providing broad access to finance 
for their growing middle-sized companies. This 
indicates the effectiveness of their programs to 
enhance companies’ productivity, starting with 
their SMEs. The Government of Singapore, for 
example, has successfully provided a variety of 
schemes for SMEs, varying from tax cuts to 
loans and grants to help finance the costs of pro-
ductivity improvements in areas such as R&D, 
automation, and capacity building.4 Indonesia 
can learn a lesson from these two countries to 
increase their own SMEs’ productivity and pro-
vide broad access to finance for the SMEs. 
3. Determinants Affecting Financial Depth 
and Financial Access in Indonesia 
From the benchmark analysis undertaken in 
the previous section, it is obvious that the overall 
financial depth in Indonesia is not competitive 
yet, when compared with the other seventeen 
benchmarked countries and three country 
groups. Especially for financial depth, as meas-
ured in the financial institutions, Indonesia ranks 
                                                          
4
 OECD (2013). 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 12. Percent of value traded outside of top 10 traded companies. 
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the lowest or second lowest of all the bench-
marked countries and shows a poor performance 
compared with the three country groups. This 
situation also applies among the ASEAN main 
countries. A better picture emerges for the finan-
cial depth of the financial markets which indi-
cates that Indonesian stock trading value, as a 
percentage of GDP, has exceeded all the three 
country groups.  
From the overall benchmarked analysis, the 
financial access in Indonesia still shows poor 
performance, with the financial markets outper-
forming the financial institutions. Yet, Indone-
sia’s financial access is significantly better than 
its financial depth. Indonesia is placed in the 
lower median and positioned at a similar level 
with Australia and Germany, although it is still 
below the ASEAN main countries’ performance. 
The position also places Indonesia equal with all 
the three country groups.  
The arguments behind the poor financial 
depth and financial access condition in Indonesia 
can be explained by reviewing some of the 
literature available. In terms of financial depth, 
to find out what factor(s) have created such poor 
performance we need to investigate what vari-
able(s) have a close link with financial depth. 
Huang (2010) concluded that conducive institu-
tional qualities for business and investment 
played the most significant role in improving the 
financial depth in developing countries, the 
country group which Indonesia belongs to.  
Another study by Cull, Senbet, and Sorge 
(2002) found that in the countries which adopted 
explicit deposit insurance systems - Indonesia 
did this by establishing LPS, a national deposit 
insurance institution - the presence of a strong 
regulatory environment and banking sector sta-
bility exerted a strong influence on their finan-
cial depth levels. Those determinant factors a 
strong regulatory system and banking sector 
stability can certainly be established if a good 
quality institutional framework is present. Their 
study complemented previous research by Cull 
(1998) which concluded that the deposit insur-
ance institution system of a country which 
acquired good environment support–that is a 
credible government and well-functioning insti-
tutions would be able to improve its financial 
depth levels.  
Having similar findings with the above are 
two other studies, i.e. Ahokpossi, et al. (2013) 
and Anayiotos & Toroyan (2009) which con-
cluded that institutional factors exerted an influ-
ence on the financial depth. Thus, those studies 
encouraged the need for institutional reform to 
enhance the financial depth and financial devel-
opment. Besides, Anayiotos and Toroyan (2009) 
also found that in comparison with asset quality5 
and profitability6, the institutional factor played 
a bigger role in improving the financial depth. 
The more detailed factors were specified by 
Chinn and Ito (2005), who concluded that 
among emerging market countries (which Indo-
nesia belongs to), a higher level of bureaucratic 
quality and law and order, as well as lower 
levels of corruption, increased the effect of 
financial openings in fostering the development 
of equity markets. 
Of all the findings results above, one general 
determinant factor obviously affecting the level 
of financial depth can be concluded, i.e. the 
institutional quality issues. In more detail, poor 
institutional quality in developing countries, 
including Indonesia, generally exists due to the 
lack of effectiveness, efficiency, and transpar-
ency in the government’s bureaucracy, weak law 
enforcement and high corruption. Respect for 
contracts and copyrights are also areas weak in 
law enforcement. In short, we can build a 
hypothesis: the low or poor financial depth in 
Indonesia happens due to the low or poor insti-
tutional quality. This paper argues that Indonesia 
similar to other developing countries or 
emerging countries as analysed in the above 
studies suffers from institutional quality prob-
lems as well.  
To provide solid arguments to prove that the 
hypothesis is true, this paper used secondary 
data from relevant surveys conducted and re-
leased by the World Bank, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), and Transparency International. 
                                                          
5
 measured by Non-Performing Loans 
6
 measured by Return on Earnings 
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The first two international institutions were 
undertaking an “Ease of Doing Business Sur-
vey”, while the WEF published the Global 
Competitiveness Report, and Transparency 
International published the Open Budget Index, 
and the Corruption Perception Index.  
The uncompetitiveness of the institutional 
quality in Indonesia is shown in 2014s compre-
hensive “Ease of Doing Business” survey. The 
survey places Singapore in the highest rank (1
st
) 
- as the economy having the strongest institu-
tions with the lowest transaction costs. Indonesia 
itself is placed 120
th
 out of 189 countries; four 
lower than the previous year when it was 116
th
. 
Indonesia lags behind other ASEAN countries 
like Malaysia (6
th
), and Thailand (18
th
), even 
Vietnam (99
th
), and the Philippines (108
th
). 
China (96
th
) outperformes Indonesia, but Indone-
sia is still better than India (134
th
) and Cambodia 
(137
th
).  
This survey disclosed that bureaucratic inef-
ficiency and ineffectiveness in Indonesia were 
obviously noticed, mainly from the obstacles 
facing businesspeople i.e. to them starting a 
business, acquiring electricity supplies, copy-
right registration, tax payments, contract enfor-
cement, and the resolution of debt and liabilities 
problems. Yet, other aspects i.e. loans or access 
to credit, investor protection, and cross border 
trade have performed as expected.  
From the government’s transparency per-
spective, according to the last Open Budget 
Index survey released in 2010 by Transparency 
International, Indonesia received a score of 51. 
The score ranges from 0 (absolutely not trans-
parent) to 100 (absolutely open or transparent). 
The score implied Indonesia has partly disclosed 
its budgetary information to the public. It may 
indicate that the intensive and continuous gov-
ernment campaigns for bureaucratic reform 
which started in the Reform Era (1999 up to 
now) have shown some progress.  
From the judicial institution’s independence 
perspective, referring to in the Global Competi-
tiveness Report 2013-2014, Indonesia is per-
ceived as being moderate,7 and ranked 74
th
 out 
of 148 countries. New Zealand was the country 
with the most independent judicial system, while 
Venezuela, a socialist country, had become the 
country with the least independent judicial sys-
tem.  
The high levels of corruption in Indonesia 
were still reflected in the Corruption Perception 
Index. According to Transparency Interna-
tional’s 2013 survey, Indonesia ranks 114th out 
of 177 observed countries. New Zealand, 
together with Denmark were declared the clean-
est countries, corruption-wise. Afghanistan and 
Somalia - two countries shattered by endless 
armed conflicts - together with North Korea, an 
isolated authoritarian country, were declared the 
most corrupt countries.  
In terms of financial access, as a further 
analysis of the causes of low financial access in 
Indonesia, this study adopted some findings 
from previous relevant literature which could be 
related to the Indonesian context. The first two 
relevant studies were Demirguc-Kunt & Kappler 
(2012) and Allen et al. (2012), which both used 
the World Bank’s Global Findex survey data 
covering 148 countries. According to their stud-
ies, the main cause of poor financial access was 
because of “Not having adequate money”; the 
option chosen by 66% of respondents in their 
survey. The respondents’ perceptions got 
stronger in the following respondents’ condi-
tions: (1) belonging to lower middle income 
group, (2) living in a family of many children, 
(3) being jobless.  
Djankov, et al. (2008) with a case study of 
Mexico, found that 89% of people with no 
access to the financial system claim “Not having 
adequate money” as the reason. Another study 
by Martinez, Hidalgo, & Tuesta (2013) which 
also used Mexico as a case study found that the 
main constraint of respondents for not having 
financial access was “Lack of income earned”. 
Aside from the above constraint, the next major-
ity constraint was grouped into “Other reasons,” 
such as “Personal reasons”. The examples of 
                                                          
7
 scored 3.6 of 7 (1 means dependent, 7 means really 
independent)  
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“Personal reasons” could be “Lack of trust” and 
“Being afraid of financial institutions”.  
In the case of Indonesia, the uniquely geo-
graphical constraint of it being an archipelagic 
country may cause additional problems. The 
cable network infrastructure to connect islands 
in Indonesia which would be necessary for the 
expansion of the banking network is more diffi-
cult to build in deep seas. This challenge may 
lead to a creative substitute technological solu-
tion, such as satellite technology, which has just 
been adopted by Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).  
Aside from that constraint, the main reason 
for the poor financial access should be more or 
less similar to that in Mexico, since basically 
both have a similar background as a developing 
lower middle income country (see Table 3), 
having the same development concerns related 
to poverty, the income gap, and poor levels of 
education. Thus, the main possible reason for the 
poor financial access in Mexico is just as rele-
vant for Indonesia, that is “Not having adequate 
money” or “Lack of income earned”. The 
assumption is reinforced by Demirguc-Kunt & 
Kappler (2012) and Allen et al. (2012), whose 
studies of 148 countries found similar reasons 
for poor financial access. 
The reason “Not having adequate money” is 
simply rooted in the classical problems of 
poverty and the high income gap in developing 
countries. Indonesia’s economy has been 
growing, yet the poverty rate is still relatively 
high. According to the most current national 
statistics agency (Central Statistics Bureau) data 
from September 2013, by adopting an average 
poverty line of about Rp 275,000 per capita per 
month, there are currently around 28 million 
poor people, out of about 246 million people 
living in Indonesia. It means that for every 100 
people in Indonesia, more than 11 of them live 
in poverty. 
 
Table 3. The World Biggest Economy 
Rank Countries 
GDP 2011, PPP 
(US$ billion) 
GDP 2011, current 
(US$ billion) 
Countries Rank 
1 United States 15,534 15,534 United States 1 
2 China 13,496 7,322 China 2 
3 India  5,758 5,897 Japan 3 
4 Japan 4,380 3,628 Germany 4 
5 Germany 3,352 2,782 France 5 
6 Russia 3,217 2,477 Brazil 6 
7 Brazil 2,816 2,462 United Kingdom 7 
8 France 2,370 2,197 Italy 8 
9 United Kingdom 2,201 1,901 Russia 9 
10 Indonesia  2,058 1,864 India  10 
11 Italy 2,057 1,778 Canada 11 
12 Mexico 1,895 1,490 Australia 12 
13 Republic of Korea  1,445 1,170 Mexico 13 
14 Canada 1,416 1,114 Republic of Korea  14 
15 Saudi Arabia  1,367 846 Indonesia  15 
16 Turkey 1,315 772 Turkey 16 
17 Australia 956 670 Saudi Arabia  17 
18 South Africa  611 402 South Africa  18 
Note:  Minus Argentina (GDP 2011 - Current amounted US$ 446 billion) which has not participated in the PPP-ICP 
program yet. If the European Union were inserted in the list, then Indonesia’s rank would decline one lower to 11th 
(GDP 2011 PPP) and 16th (GDP 2011 Current).  
Source of data: ICP, World Bank  
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Other data also shows that the benefits of In-
donesia’s economic growth have not been 
evenly distributed, and more of the growing pie 
went to the upper middle class. As the World 
Bank’s Gini index8 score shows, Indonesia’s 
Gini index increased from 29.0 (1999) to 34.1 
(2008) and the latest was 38.1 (2011).9 While a 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality and 
an index of 100 implies perfect inequality, Indo-
nesia’s growing index score shows that the dis-
tribution of income or consumption expenditure 
among individuals or households in Indonesia is 
getting more and more unequal.  
The second main reason found in Mexico, 
which may also reflect the situation in Indonesia 
was “Personal reasons” such as “Lack of trust” 
and “Being afraid of financial institutions”.  
Such conditions (i.e. “Lack of trust” and 
“Being afraid of financial institutions”) among 
Indonesian people may occur due to the mush-
rooming practice of loan sharking10 in the cities, 
suburban and rural areas. These illegal practices 
are carried out by a person or micro financial 
institution, without official licenses from the 
government authorities to conduct any credit or 
lending activities. The forms of micro financial 
institutions operating the loan shark practices 
can be, but are not limited to, cooperatives or 
Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR).11 
Loan shark lending practices are commonly 
marked by excessively high rates of interest, 
some of them may charge their borrowers 10% 
interest per month, a few of them may demand 
20% interest per month, while some others can 
set daily interest rates. 
If the debtors cannot meet the terms of their 
loan, a few loan sharks practice tricks on their 
borrowers in default, by finding them another 
loan shark to borrow from. The first loan shark 
                                                          
8
 The Gini index/ratio/coefficient was developed by the 
Italian statistician and sociologist Corrado Gini and 
published in his 1912 paper "Variability and Mutability". 
It is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to repre-
sent the income distribution of a nation's residents. It has 
become the most commonly used measure of inequality. 
9
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI 
10
  a person or an illegal financial institution who lends 
money at excessively high rates of interest 
11
  a small regional bank operating in the suburban areas, 
local cities and rural areas 
acts as if he/she has facilitated a solution for the 
debtors, but in fact it is for the sake of the first 
loan shark only and the debtors now are trapped 
in a never ending cycle of debt. The ‘victims’ 
may lose all their belongings and possibly be-
come the target of vicious and brutal debt col-
lectors (see Usman, et al. (2004), Batubara, et al. 
(2010), and news in local and national media).12  
Such cases have been of concern to the rele-
vant supervisory government agency (i.e. 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan). Nonetheless, the 
policy measures from the agency are still in the 
discussion stage; and thus will not be enacted in 
the near future. The agency is planning to design 
a special interest mechanism for the micro 
finance institutions, a mechanism intended to 
resolve the excessively high rates of interest they 
charge their borrowers/debtors. 
The poor financial access in Indonesia may 
also be caused in part by the less than effective 
national finance development policy, amidst the 
high foreign presence in the Indonesian banking 
structure. As indicated in Figure 13, based on the 
benchmark analysis, the percentage of foreign 
ownership of Indonesian banks’ asset is 32%, 
which is the second highest after Cambodia. 
Meanwhile, the percentage of foreign banks in 
Indonesia’s banking structure is 52%13, which is 
the third highest after the UK and Singapore (see 
Figure 14). With such high foreign ownership, 
Indonesia’s financial sector policies are possibly 
not able to create enough support from the na-
tional banking industry to optimize the contribu-
tions to promote financial access or financial 
inclusion in Indonesia. 
                                                          
12
  some news for illustrations, see http://www. 
timorexpress.com/flores-raya/lima-koperasi-dinilai-
lintah-darat; http://www.lensaindonesia.com/2015/06/ 
06/rentenir-merajalela-bupati-bogor-malah-tutup-
mata.html; http://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20150611/ 
89/442504/suku-bunga-lkm-10-tahun-ke-depan-
praktik-rentenir-berkurang; 
http://petahmelayu.com/kacau-banyak-lintah-darat-
berkedok-koperasi.html; 
http://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/20
15/02/03/38026/ulah-lintah-darat-pinjam-6-juta-bayar-
40-juta.html; http://www.kapurnews.com/2015/05/28/ 
waspada-banyak-lintah-darat-berkedok-koperasi-di-
meranti  
13
  foreign bank is defined as a bank with more than 51% 
of shares owned by foreign parties. 
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Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 13. Percentage of Foreign Owned Bank Assets to Total Bank Assets 
 
 
 
Source of data: GFDD, World Bank (2013) 
 
Figure 14. Percentage of Foreign Banks to Total Banks  
 
The above argument gains strong support 
from Dymski (2005) and Hamada (2013). 
Dymski (2005) found that financial globalization 
created financial exclusion, which was caused by 
multinational financial corporate strategies 
focused on the most profitable credit markets. 
Hamada (2013) subsequently provided evidence 
that the foreign owned banks in Indonesia tended 
to reduce their credit to Small and Medium En-
terprises (SMEs). That is factual, since even 
locally owned banks are often geared to wealth-
ier customers, which demotivates lower socio-
economic groups from applying for banking 
services. 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) has im-
plicitly acknowledged the less than effective 
current national policy to address the financial 
inclusion issues. The GoI has mapped nine iden-
tified financial inclusion policy issues (see Table 
4), as documented in an official government 
document related to the national strategy for 
financial inclusion14. In general, the problems 
are still basically fundamental and therefore in 
need of GoI’s persistent, consistent and serious 
attention. 
Such openness in Indonesia’s financial sec-
tor which originated with the strong need for 
foreign capital injections into troubled local 
banks in 1998 with its poor financial inclusion 
level is contradictory to the picture from 
neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and the 
Philippines, which have much less open finan-
cial sectors but have significantly higher levels 
of financial inclusion (see Table 5). The chal-
lenge for promoting financial inclusion in Indo-
nesia is relatively higher in the rural areas, since 
the financial inclusion level there is significantly 
lower than in the urban areas. 
 
                                                          
14
  Vice President Secretariat Republic of Indonesia (2012), 
”National Strategy for Financial Inclusion Fostering 
Economic Growth and Accelerating Poverty Reduction” 
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Table 4. Financial Inclusion Policy Issues in Indonesia 
Nr. Issues 
1. Many poorer people or small entrepreneurs are not able to satisfy the banks’ strict requirements.  
2. Most of the large financial institutions have no or little interest in dealing with many small scale clients 
since it is not very profitable. 
3. The financial services products do not conform to the requirements of specific groups in the population. 
4. There is no adequate regulatory environment to facilitate innovative financial services 
5. Demand-side barriers: lack of a formal identification system, low levels of financial literacy, inability to 
track personal financial history, and the absence of appropriate consumer protection mechanisms 
6. Low income groups perceive dealing with financial institutions to be a difficult process. 
7. Banks are more interested in dealing with wealthier customers, which discourages poorer people from 
accessing banking services 
8. The need for mobile banking to be developed since it is quick, reliable, safe and a low cost solution for 
transferring funds. According to the IFC Report, 22 % of 114 million mobile phone subscribers have 
shown an interest in using mobile phones to conduct banking transactions.  
9.  For particular groups of customers, their socio-cultural backgrounds may make it difficult to ask for 
financial services. 
Table 5. Financial Inclusion Comparison 
Nr. Level LMCs Average Indonesia Malaysia The Philippines 
1. Urban 33.8% 28.9% 77.6% 37.1% 
2. Rural Pedesaan 26% 16.2% 51.8% 19.5% 
3. National 28.4% 19.6% 66.2% 26.6% 
Source of data: Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper (2012).  
 
CONCLUSION  
Five indicators were adopted to measure and 
benchmark the financial depth, those were (1) 
private credit (banking and capital market) to 
GDP; (2) assets of financial institutions to GDP; 
(3) private financing (banking, non-banking 
financing, capital market, bond market) to GDP; 
(4) domestic stock capitalization and private 
debt securities to GDP; (5) stock trading value to 
GDP. The first two indicators were adopted for 
the financial institutions, the last two were for 
the financial markets, and the third one was for 
the combined financial institutions and financial 
markets. In general, the higher the indicator 
value was, the deeper the financial depth or the 
bigger the financial size of a particular country 
was.  
To reflect financial access or financial inclu-
sion characteristics, five indicators were 
adopted, those were: (1) bank branches per 
100,000 people; (2) ATMs per 100,000 people; 
(3) percentage of people with a formal account; 
(4) percent of market capitalization outside of 
the top 10 largest companies; and (5) percent of 
value traded outside of the top 10 traded compa-
nies. In general, the higher the indicator value, 
the more access the public had or the more 
inclusive the public were in their country’s 
financial system. 
With reference to the benchmark analysis of 
the financial depth of Indonesia with the bench-
mark countries (in ASEAN, ASEAN+3, BRICS, 
and financial centers in the world and Asia) and 
the benchmark group of countries (Lower 
Middle Income Countries (LMCs), Developing 
East Asia Pacific Countries (Dev. EAPs), and 
the World), all in all Indonesia’s financial depth 
does not indicate a satisfactory result, since its 
rank was usually the lowest or the second 
lowest. Besides, Indonesia cannot compete with 
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ASEAN or the ASEAN+3 levels. In comparison 
with the country group average, for the financial 
institutions, Indonesia was still below the three 
benchmarked group countries. Yet, for the 
financial markets one indicator (i.e. stock trading 
value to GDP) showed Indonesia was already 
above the three benchmarked group countries, 
and another one (domestic stock capitalization 
and private debt securities to GDP) showed 
Indonesia was above the LMCs. 
Benchmarked analysis of the financial access 
results in a better picture for Indonesia, espe-
cially for the financial markets. Despite its low 
average position, Indonesia was able to compete 
with Australia and Germany and still be within 
the average range of the three benchmarked 
group countries. 
As it is generally found in developing coun-
tries, and with support from strong evidence 
taken from a number of international organiza-
tions’ surveys, it can be inferred that the main 
factor driving the poor financial depth in Indone-
sia is the non-competitiveness of the institutions. 
Meanwhile, the driving force of poor financial 
access in Indonesia are the geographical con-
straints, poverty, a high income gap, and less 
than effective national financial development 
policies amidst the high foreign presence in the 
Indonesian banking structure. 
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